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This paper studies how social pressure affects the behavior of soccer referees. We make use 
of an attractive source of exogenous variation in the number of spectators at matches. Due to 
recent hooligan violence, the Italian government has implemented a regulation that forces 
some soccer teams to temporarily play home matches in empty stadiums. We find that 
referees punish away players more harshly and home players more lightly when the games are 
played in front of spectators compared to when they are not. This indicates that referees 
exhibit home bias caused by social pressure from the spectators. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of social pressure on behavior is an important element in many areas of the society 
(e.g., for workplace productivity, politics, the judicial system, social customs and sports). 
There is a voluminous theoretical literature in economics that deals with this topic (see e.g. 
Akerlof 1980, Bernheim 1994, and Becker and Murphy 2000) but there is considerably less 
empirical work.
1  
The contribution of this paper is to provide such evidence from the impact of 
spectators on the behavior of referees. We use a unique exogenous source of variation in the 
number of spectators due to hooligan violence in Italy on February 2, 2007. In response to the 
incident, the Italian minister of interior declared that spectators would only be allowed into 
those arenas that fulfilled certain requirements. In total, 24 games have so far been played 
without spectators in the Italian soccer leagues Serie A and Serie B.  
Our empirical identification strategy is to compare the behavior of the same referee in 
games with and without spectators, i.e., we make use of referee specific-fixed effect 
specifications. We find large and statistically significant effects that away players received 
fewer punishments (i.e., fewer fouls and cards) in the games they played without spectators 
while the home players were often punished more harshly. This strongly suggests that 
pressure from the spectators affects the referees’ behavior.   
This paper is related to a small literature on the behavior of referees. For example, 
Garicano et al. (2005) and Dohmen (2005) find that referees systematically favor the home 
team by shortening close games where the home team is ahead, and lengthening close games 
where the home team is behind.
2  Thanks to the exogenous source of variation in the number 
of spectators in the Italian soccer leagues, we believe that our research strategy adds 
considerably to this literature.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, the source 
of exogenous variation, and the empirical strategy. The results are presented in Section 3 and 
Section 4 concludes. 
  
                                                 
1 Interesting exceptions are Garicano et al. (2005), Dohmen (2005) and Sutter and Kocher (2004). 
2 Nevill et al. (2002) found that English referees who watched video-taped tackles with the sound from the crowd 
called for 15.5 percent fewer fouls for the home team compared to those that did not hear the sound.   2
2. Data and empirical framework 
 
On February 2, 2007, supporters from the Italian football clubs Calcio Catania and Palermo 
Calcio clashed with each other and the police in Catania in serious acts of hooligan violence. 
Police officer Filippo Raciti was killed and around hundred people were injured. Following 
the riots, the Italian government announced that the enforcement of the current football stadia 
act, “Decreto Pisanu”, enacted in 2005, would be radically changed. In its original form, it 
required Italian football clubs to meet specific safety standards in their stadiums. However, 
with the indulgence of the government, these standards have been ignored by most of Serie A 
and Serie B clubs, and virtually all games have been played in front of spectators. Following 
the events in Catania, the government altered its position and forced the clubs that had 
stadiums with deficient safety standards to play their home games without spectators.   
We will use the drastically tightened enforcement of the football stadia act as an 
exogenous variation in the number of spectators to evaluate the hypothesis that referees may 
be biased due to social pressure. We use data from serie A and serie B for the season 
2006/2007, which altogether consists of 842 games.
3 Currently, 24 games have been played 
without spectators due to the inability to comply with the act. Apart from Calcio Catania and 
Brescia Calcio, all teams are now allowed to have spectators again.
4  Table 1 shows the games 
that have been played without spectators.  
Referees control the games by having the possibility to adjudicate fouls, yellow cards, 
and red cards. Committing a foul implies that the opposing team gets possession of the ball.
5 
If one player receives two yellow cards, or one instant red card, then he is sent off the pitch. 
This implies that his team has to play one man short, which is a significant disadvantage.
6 So 
far, 41 different individuals have refereed games in the two leagues. 36 referees are active in 
both serie A and serie B and five in serie B only. The average number of games per referee is 
currently approximately 20.
7  
                                                 
3 The 20 teams in serie A and the 22 teams in serie B play each other twice per year. 
4 Because the hooligan event took place in Catania, and because the club has not complied with safety regulation 
earlier, Calcio Catania has to play all of its home fixtures at a neutral venue without spectators. Due to this 
special regulation, and since the hooligan event may be correlated with the clubs’ outcomes, we exclude this 
club’s home games without spectators from our analysis.  However, our results are not affected qualitatively by 
the inclusion of these games. 
5 If the foul is committed close the own team’s penalty area, i.e., the own goal, then the free kick that follows 
gives the opposing team an excellent opportunity to score.  
6 He may also be suspended for games in the future. This, however, does not affect the number of players on the 
pitch. 
7 Referees are appointed on the Friday before the games are played. The salary is 70 000 euro per year or 35 000 
per year depending on experience. The referees additionally receive 3 500 euro per game in serie A and 2 000 
euro per game in Serie B.     3
The data is obtained from the Italian newspaper La Gazzetta dello Sport’s home page. 
Because the number of fouls per game differs across sources, we also use data on fouls from 
the home page of ESPN (the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network). Table 2 
provides summary statistics for home and away teams regarding the number of fouls, the 
number of yellow cards, and the number of red cards. 
To test whether referees are biased due to social pressure we use the following set up. 
Let Yij denote referee i’s behavior in game j (fouls, yellow cards, and red cards) and let 
no_spectators be an indicator variable for the games when the teams were forced to play 
without any spectators. We can now estimate the effect of having no spectators on the 
referee‘s behavior by running the regression 
 
(1) Y ij=αj + βno_spectatorsij + vij,  
 
where αj is a referee fixed effect. The parameter β measures the effect of having no spectators 
on the behavior of the referee. It is important to note that the parameter β is identified only by 
the within referee variation since we include fixed referee effects. In other words, we compare 
the behavior of the same referee when he is a referee in a game with no spectators compared 
to a game with many thousands of spectators.
8 To be able to test whether the referee is biased, 
we separate the behavioral response of a referee towards both the home team and the away 
team in games with many or with no spectators.  The referee is biased if he would give the 
home team more punishments (e.g., fouls, yellow cards and red cards) compared to the away 
team in the games without spectators. In other words, we estimate separate regressions of (1) 
for both the home team and the away team, and define the bias of the referee as the difference 
between the coefficient β for the home team, β
Home, and the away team, β
Away. Thus, the 
referee is biased due to social pressure if β
Home>β
Away and unbiased if β
Home=β
Away.
9 Here, we 
implicitly assume that the incentives of players of both the home team and away team are 
affected similarly of the presence or absence of spectators and the only reasons why 
β
Home>β
Away is because of the behavior of the referee. If players are affected by spectators, 
                                                 
8 The average number of spectators is 18 376 in serie A and 8 286 in serie B. 
9 This approach is equivalent to a “difference-in-difference” model, i.e., Y= δhome_team +θ no_specators  + 
πhome_team×no_spectators + referee fixed effects, where home_team is an indicator of whether the team is a  
home team or not. Thus, this set up consists of a group fixed effect (home_team), a treatment indicator 
(no_specators), and an interaction between the group and treatment indicators (home_team×no_specators) where 
the different-in difference parameter is π=β
Home-β
Away. This specification makes it clear that the identifying 
assumption is that there are no other interactions between group and treatment except for the treatment (no-
spectators) itself.    4
then we find it likely that home teams play more intensively in front of spectators. Thus, if 
anything, our estimate of the size of the bias of the referee is likely to be underestimated.  
3. Results 
 
In this section we provide evidence on the behavior of Italian referees, i.e., results from 
estimating equation (1) for both the home and away teams. Table 3 shows the results from 
these regressions. Columns 1 and 2 display the results for the number of fouls. The results are 
striking: while the referee gives the away team 2.6 fewer fouls when there are no spectators, 
he gives the home team 1.7 more fouls. Thus the estimate of the referee bias is 1.7-(-2.6) = 
4.3 fouls. This is highly statistically significant as can be seen by the t-test for equality of the 
two parameters, β
Home=β
Away in the third row of the column. Since the average number of 
fouls is 19 per team and game, the bias effect is as high as 23 percent.  
Columns 3 and 4 report the results for the number of yellow cards. Once again, we see 
a striking difference between a referee’s behavior towards the home team and the away team 
in games without spectators. The referee gives somewhat fewer yellow cards to the home 
team (-0.48) in the games without spectators compared to the games with spectators. But 
because they give the away team much fewer yellow cards, -1.16, the estimate of the referee 
bias is -.0.48-(-1.16) =.68 cards, which is statistically significant at the 5.7 percent level. In 
columns 5 and 6, we present the results on the number of red cards. The differential impact on 
the home and away team is in line with the previous results. The referee bias is -.06-0.13=.07 
red cards, which is statically significant at the 10 percent level. The average number of yellow 
and red cards is 2.62 and 0.105 respectively. The estimated referee bias therefore constitutes a 
26 percent effect for yellow cards, and a 70 percent effect for red cards. Table 4 shows that 
these results are robust to including home team and away fixed effects. The estimated bias 
effect is 4.56 for fouls, 0.61 for yellow cards, and 0.07 for red cards. In fact, the results also 
hold without any controls (i.e., referee and team fixed effects) since the estimated bias effect 
is 3.96 for fouls (t=3.98, p-value=0.000), 0.63 for yellow cards (t=2.00, p-value=0.052), and 
.085 for red cards (t=1.74, p-value=0.089). Finally, the results on referee bias do not change 
when serie A and serie B are studied separately as can be seen from Tables 5 and 6 
respectively (the estimated effects are however less precisely measured). Taken together, the 
consistency of the estimated bias effect across different specifications and across different 
outcomes of the referee strongly suggests that the estimated referee effect is caused by social 
pressure from the crowd.    5
4. Conclusions 
 
Soccer referees are supposed to be neutral. Yet, we find evidence that Italian referees change 
their behavior in games played without spectators. The evidence we provide is consistent with 
the idea that individuals are likely to change their behavior under influence of social pressure. 
An alternative explanation of our findings is that  players,  rather than referees, 
change their behavior in games without spectators. However, for this explanation to be true, 
home players must play less intensively in games with spectators compared to without. We 
find it more reasonable that home teams play more aggressively in games with spectators. 
Thus, we are probably understating the true referee bias effect.  
Our results may have further implications outside the world of sports. For example, 
courts and politicians could be affected by pressure from media, which may affect their 




   6
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Table 1. Games without spectators 
Date Home  team  Away team 
Serie A 
February 17  Ascoli  Udinese 
February 11  Atalanta  Lazio 
February 25  Catania  Internazionale 
March 04  Catania  Siena 
March 13  Catania  Reggina 
February 17  Catania  Fiorentina 
February 11  Chievo  Internazionale 
February 17  Empoli  AS Roma 
February 11  Fiorentina  Udinese 
February 18  Livorno  Messina 
February 11  Messina  Catania 
    
Serie B 
February 17  Albinoleffe  Triestina 
March 17  Brescia  Rimini 
February 24  Brescia  Verona 
February 10  Brescia  Bari 
February 10  Lecce  Verona 
February 17  Mantova  Lecce 
February 10  Modena  Albinoleffe 
December 16  Napoli
10 Mantova 
February 10  Napoli  Piacenza 
February 18  Napoli  Arezzo 
February 10  Pescara  Mantova 
February 24  Piacenza  Genoa 
February 10  Triestina  Treviso 
February 17  Verona  Spezia 
                                                 
10 This game was played without spectators in Perugia due to previous Napoli-related hooliganism.   8
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
  Mean St.  Dev.  Min  Max 
 
Home Team 
Fouls  19.27      5.15           7  46 
Yellow Card  2.44  1.28  0  7 
Red Card  0.089  0.296  0  2 
 
Away Team 
Fouls  19.33     5.23           7           49 
Yellow Card  2.79  1.47  0  9 
Red Card  0.121  0.342  0  2 
Note: The information about yellow cards and the red cards is taken from Italian newspaper La Gazzetta dello 
Sport’s home page. The information about fouls is taken from both the Italian newspaper La Gazzetta dello 
Sport’s home page and from the home page of ESPN (the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network).  
 
 
         
      9
 
Table 3. Behavior of the referee regarding the away and home teams 
 
  Fouls  Yellow cards  Red cards 
  Home team  Away team  Home team Away  team Home  team Away  team 
















p-value within parenthesis 
 
t= 3.91  
(0.000) 





2  0.1120 0.1076 0.1106 0.0975 0.0704 0.0802 
Number  of  observations  578 578 582 582 582 582 




Table 4. Behavior of the referee regarding the away and home teams controlling for home and away team fixed effects 
 
  Fouls  Yellow cards  Red cards 
  Home team  Away team  Home team Away  team Home  team Away  team 












Referee  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Home  team  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Away  team  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-test: β
Home=β




t= 1.64    
(0.108) 
R
2  0.3596 0.3953 0.3302 0.3007 0.2145 0.2083 
Number  of  observations  578 578 582 582 582 582 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the level of referee.   10
 
 
Table 5. Serie A. Behavior of the referee regarding the away and home teams 
 
  Fouls  Yellow cards  Red cards 
  Home team  Away team  Home team Away  team Home  team Away  team 












Referee  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-test: β
Home=β
Away  t= 2.67    
(0.011) 
t= 1.54    
(0.131) 
t= 2.03    
(0.050) 
R
2  0.1200 0.1383 0.1541 0.1461 0.1197 0.1680 
Number  of  observations  277 277 277 277 277 277 







Table 6. Serie B. Behavior of the referee regarding the away and home teams 
 
  Fouls  Yellow cards  Red cards 
  Home team  Away team  Home team Away  team Home  team Away  team 












Referee  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-test: β
Home=β




t= 1.25    
(0.219   ) 
R
2  0.1909 0.1746 0.1734 0.1366 0.1292 0.1482 
Number  of  observations  301 301 305 305 305 305 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the level of referee. 
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